The Following Summaries Have Not Been Reviewed By Rabbi Kahn
1) Bal Tashchit (lecture #18)
The source of Bal Tashchit is Dvarim 20, which states one may not chop down fruit trees during a siege but may cut down other trees. We learn this halacha applies elsewhere from Rabbi Elazar, who said that he heard that one in mourning who tears too much clothing is guilty of bal tashchit. The halacha is more of a macro-perspective than a micro-law, in which contextual needs may override the prohibition, particularly human needs. For example, one may cut down a tree which is not producing enough or if it’s worth more dead than alive. Alternately, one may burn furniture to stay warm. The Rash stresses the prohibition is limited to destroying for the sake of destruction in permitting one to rip up a fruit tree in order to build a sukkah. The Rambam extends the prohibition from trees to destroying items such as clothes or utensils for no purpose.
2) Leaving Israel (lecture #28)
The issue of leaving Eretz Israel may be traced to Lekh Lekha, when Avraham Avinu entered the Land and just 10 verses later left for Egypt because of a famine. The Ramban, who counted the commandment to live in Israel as one of the 613 mitzvoth, ruled that Abraham had no right to leave inadvertently sinned by putting his righteous wife in such a situation and not trusting God’s ability to save him. While the Ramban argued one should not leave the Land under any circumstances, the rabbis in general taught one may leave if the prices are too high, i.e., in times of economic hardship. In the Gemara (Avoda Zara) it is written a Cohen may leave the Land only for one of three reasons: a serious business issue, to study Torah or to marry a spouse. The Rambam codified this law to say a Cohen may go abroad to fulfill a mitzvah, so he couldn’t go for, say, a leisurely vacation. The Rambam did not count living in Israel as one of the 613 mitzvoth but said one should live there.
Many other great rabbis expressed opinions about the issue of leaving the Land. The Meiri said it is better to live in a non-religious idolatrous place in Israel than in a religious place abroad. The Maaritz said one should not leave because G-d is closer in the Land. Rashi says the prohibition to leave only applies to residents of Israel, but Jews whose residence is in Galut may visit and leave the country. Tosefot said you can’t leave permanently, only to fulfill some important mitzvoth, while the Sheilta (Achai Gaon) says one may leave temporarily for any mitzvah. Rav Kook also said one can leave for any mitzvah, and that Tosefot was only referring to a Cohen.
3) Inviting a non-Shomer Shabbat person on Shabbat (lecture #40)
This issue is a modern dilemma when modern transportation allowed Jews to move away from the core of their community, so it is important to understand the context in which rabbis made rulings about it. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, writing in the 1950s, likened inviting someone to shul who will drive their to breaking the halacha of ‘lifnei iver’ (putting a stumbling block before the blind). He said that inviting someone who lives far away and would have to break Shabbat is worse than lifeni iver, it is a problem of mesit – inciting someone to sin. On the other hand, if one simply informs people of an event on Shabbat but does not invite them, it is neither. He refers to the case of the nazir on an island. To bring him wine is lifnei iver because he could not have acquired the wine without you. Thus, we learn it’s not about the cause but about facilitating the sin.
Another aspect is ‘sha’at aveira’, the time of sin. Rashi writes you can’t help somebody sin at the point of sin. The Ahronim say if you do something that others may sin In the future you’re not aiding them to sin because it’s not taking place at the moment. For example, a butcher may sell non-kosher meat to a Jew who insists. The man could have bought the meat from not on a Torah level of lifnei iver, and since he’s not eating it right away, it’s not the rabbinic level of ‘mesayea’, assisting. The Shach, taking an idea from tosefot, says there may not be an issue of tochacha with a non-practicing Jew, so while one is obligated to stop a Jew from sinning, there is no such rabbinic problem with a non-practicing Jew, although how far to take this concept is unclear. Rabbi Sternbach in South Africa said it is permissible for a ba’al tshuva child to invite a non-observant parent for a Shabbat meal for the sake of being mekarev. You can do tochacha by telling your parent that it pains for them to break Shabbat, so it can’t be called lifnei iver.
4) Glatt Kosher (lecture #44)
The halacha refers to Exodus 22:30 stating that an animal with a punctured lung is treif. According to the Shulchan Aruch, one must check the lungs. According to Rabbi Yosef Karo, if it’s smooth(the meaning of Glatt), it’s kosher. If there is an adhesion, it’s treif. The Sephardi tradition holds by Beit Yosef. The RAMA (Moshe Isserles), on the other hand, permitted the method of peeling and testing the adhesions. If upon inspection it is a hard lesion, it’s treif. But, if it is “ririn” (a secretion, or to use the scientific term, guck), it is permitted. The Rosh made this ruling in the 13th century. So, if one can squish the adhesion, one may conclude it is not a lesion. He was not enthusiastic about this position but ruled it held as the custom of the community. Note this custom does not apply to small animals like lamb or veal, which must be Glatt. The Rashba said he never heard of such a thing and that giving such meat is the same as feeding treif food. However, the Maharshal says this is the custom and the fact that one hasn’t heard anything doesn’t mean it isn’t there, rendering that defense meaningless.
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef makes an interesting ruling on whether one is permitted to eat meat at a seudat mitzvah. Following Beit Yosef as a Sephardi, he stresses that all Jews should eat strictly Glatt but then presents an argument permitting one to eat meat at a seudat mitzvah without questioning whether or not it is Glatt. Bearing in mind that one observes a safek d’raita l’humra and a safek d’rabanin l’kula, he introduces the idea of a safek safeka, which is a doubt of a doubt. Since safek d’raita l’humra is rabbinic law, then a safek sfeka is allowed. In this case, the first safek is that perhaps there never was a sirha (adhesion) in the first place, and the second safek is that even if there was, perhaps the others are right and it is merely ririn. Thus, one may eat at another’s home and certainly at a seudat mitzvah such as a meal at a parent’s home or a simha.
5) Waiting from milk to meat (lecture #47)
The halacha of waiting from milk to meat is part of the more common question how long one should wait to eat dairy after eating meat. In the Gemara, Rav Hisda said if you eat meat you cannot eat cheese, but if you eat cheese you can eat meat. In the Shulhan Aruch it is written that if you eat cheese you may eat meat immediately afterwards but you have to make sure to inspect your hands. You also have to wipe out your mouth, eat a plain piece of bread and rinse out your mouth properly before meat (not chicken because it is not meat on a Torah level). The RAMA said that some are stringent not to eat meat immediately after cheese. He adds it is customary not to eat meat after hard cheese, not even to eat chicken. The Gra said the source for being stringent is in the Zohar, and that it is not arguing on the Gemara but rather expressing an opinion where one may be more stringent.
The Taz (Rabbi David Helevi) discussed the element of time, saying if one is stringent one waits an equal amount of time after hard cheese as one would after meat. He defines hard cheese as moldy looking cheese more than six months old. The Maharam of Rothenberg said he had considered the practice of being strict a heresy when he was young but after finding cheese in his teeth after a meal, he took it upon himself as a personal humra (stringency). The Ben Ish Chai recommended waiting one hour for each month the cheese was aged up to six hours. Regardless of how long one chooses to wait, the conclusion is that Zohar represents a humra but does not supersede the Gemara. Therefore, one who holds the custom of waiting is doing it more as a personal humra rather than as an act of following strict halacha.
6) Women and Zimmun (lecture #60)
The purpose of a zimmun as explained by the Meiri is to prepare us that we are about to say a bracha. It is not Torah law like saying the Grace after Meals, but rather a rabbinic obligation to prepare together to praise G-d. The obligation to have a zimmun is found in Brachot, which states that (minimally) three people who eat together have an obligation to do a zimmun. It continues that women, slaves and small ones are not included with that zimmun. The Gmara states that women do make a zimmun by themselves being of three different minds, but also that if they want to make a zimmun together with servants they can’t, so it’s not clear whether women do this as an obligation or as an option (noting that women are not obligated by time-bound positive commandments). Rashi understands from the text that there is no obligation. However, according to Eruchin daf gimel everybody is obligated on zimmun, including women (and servants), each by themselves.
Tosefot, commenting on Brachot, says it seems three women can do zimmun, by themselves (because it said so). He adds and so behaved the daughters of R. Avraham the father-in-law of R. Yehuda but points out women of his generation don’t know about this. He says it is difficult that women don’t do it when it seems to be an obligation. He then turns it into an option by relying on the latter phrase ‘if women want to do zimmun together with servants they can’t’ to tone down the earlier definitive phrase and say it sounds like it’s optional. His agenda seemed to be defending why women weren’t doing something that sounded like an obligation. The Rosh gives the same answer as Tosefot but doesn’t like it. He rejects the so-called proof that the second part takes away the first, which sounds like zimmun is an obligation to everybody. Smag says obligation is when there’s a mixed group, it’s optional when it’s only women. Shulhan Orech rules zimmun is optional, following Rashi and Tosefot, but when they eat with men they are obliged, following the Smag. Ben Ish Hai says one should be proactive to instruct women in zimmun.
7) Chalav Yisrael (lecture #64)
The issue of Chalav Yisrael arose in the discussion in Avoda Zara prohibiting Jews from consuming milk which is milked by an idolater when there is no Jew around to watch it. There are two ways to understand this prohibition, either as a kashrut concern because you don’t know where the milk came from, or a gezera such as stam yenum, by which an idolater might use wine for libations. We learn from the Mordechai that the idea is a concern about kashrut rather than a rabbinic decree because he argues that a Jew needs to be present, lest the non-Jew mix kosher milk in a barrel containing non-kosher milk residue. The Shulchan Aruch and the Pri Hadash also relate to the issue as a kashrut concern. The Shulchan Aruch writes it is enough for a Jew observing the process to sit outside a farm with only kosher animals for the milk to be considered chalav yisrael. If there are non-kosher animals it would be enough if he can see what is going on by standing up because the non-Jew would be afraid the Jew would see what he was doing. The Pri Hadash says that because the concern is mixing non-kosher milk with kosher milk it’s enough that a Jew could have seen the process because of the fear factor. He goes further to say that if non-kosher milk is more expensive one is allowed to believe the non-Jew’s testimony, who has no reason to pass off more expensive milk as cheaper milk. The Hatam Sofer took an opposing view, writing that according to Rashi the prohibition was an ancient gezera and argued that perhaps the prohibition started out as a concern with kashrut but had become established as a gezera, such that non-Jewish milk is not kosher. The Chazon Ish said that in modern times it is permissible to accept government supervision, which he equates to the non-Jewish maid who makes milk in a Jew’s home.
Another question is whether chalav yisrael applies to milk products, since the mishna only mentions milk. The Rambam notes some Gaonim said there is no decree against butter because the mishna explicitly said milk. He points out one cannot physically make butter from non-kosher animals, so being that 1) the mishna only said milk and 2) butter can only be made from kosher animals, butter from a non-Jew is permitted.
8) Renting and selling homes to non-Jews in Israel (lecture #67)
The recent debate over whether Jews are permitted to rent and sell home to non-Jews in Israel is rooted in concept of Lo Techonem mentioned in Devarim 7:1-2. Rashi gives two interpretations of the phrase: don’t give them ‘hen’ as in don’t be nice to non-Jews, and don’t give them haniya in the Land, i.e., allow them to settle among you. A third interpretation is that a Jew should not give them things for free. The Gemara says the way the verse is worded (it could have said ‘lo tehunam’) these interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Joseph Reb Hanina says don’t give them something which will give them a connectedness with the land. The Mishna says you shouldn’t sell to them anything connected to the ground but if you cut it down you can sell it.
There is also a question whether the mitzvah applies to all non-Jews, idolaters or just the seven nations mentioned in the verse. Rambam says in his avoda zara commentary you should not make a covenant with the 7 nations, based on the Torah, because of fear of idol worshiping. He also bases his ruling on Rashi’s interpretation of lo techonem. However, it is not forbidden to sell to one living in the land who has accepted the 7 Noahide laws. The Ravad is critical that the Ram bam expanded the definition. Sefer Mitzvot Gadol follows the Ravad. Tosefot is bothered by the same thing but suggests the Torah used the 7 nations as an example because they were involved in idolatry. The Meiri quotes Tosefta Rambam to say if you know the non-Jew you’re allowed to sell the land. The TAZ gives a similar answer. The point is that if you know the person there is a quid pro quo so it’s not free. Moreover, the prohibition does not apply to monotheists, so you don’t have to know them because there is no problem of lo techonem. Tosefot says renting to Christians is not a problem because they are not really worshipping any idols they bring home. Beit Yosef says our custom is to rent to non-Jews based on Tosefot. Rav Herzog says Rav Kook held that Arabs in Eretz Israel have the law of Ger Toshav, and certainly when you have a whole nation that has accepted upon themselves the 7 mitzvoth then lo techonem does not apply to Muslims, which opens the door to heter mechira but also to the original issue of selling or renting a home to a non-Jew in Israel.
9) Avoiding Arguments - Not To Be Like Korach (lecture #70)
After the punishment of Korach and his followers the people are warned not to act as he did. Moses could have just used his authority to put an immediate end to Korach’s rebellion but the way he handled it teaches that a person should not hold on to or strengthen a ‘makhloket.’ The Gemara brings proof of this when Moshe got up to speak to Korach and his followers. Rashi and the Rav also see Moshe’s motivation to not hold onto the makhloket in his behavior, the Rav arguing one is breaking a negative mitzvah by causing dissension or strengthening an argument. The Rif and the Rosh take the Gemara at face value, quoting it to argue they have broken a negative commandment. This is not to say that one should avoid arguments. The schools of Hillel and Shammai had disagreements but the Gemara teaches their disciples families married each other to show that they accepted the validity of each other’s arguments even if they did not agree with them. Thus, having a different opinion is not the problem but needlessly promoting or strengthening the makhloket.
The Rambam, however, in Sefer Mitzvot argued with the Rif saying that Moshe is talking about a negative trait but not a prohibition, and that the issue is the priesthood not any makhloket per se. Rather, he links the negative commandment of not holding onto an argument as lo titgodedu, which literally means not to cut yourself (as the Amori did) for it says in the Gemara that you should not make yourselves into separate groups. He interprets the word to mean not cutting one’s family or community. The Rambam included in the idea of not cutting yourself is having two courts with two traditions because this approach will create fights within the community. So he disagreed on a technicality but came to the same conclusion using a different source.
10) Listening to Gossip - Accepting Richilut (lecture #74)
The source for the discussion about gossip is the verse from Leviticus 19:1516 that you should not pervert justice, that you should pursue justice, that you should not go as a ‘rachil’ in your nation and that you should not ‘stand on your neighbor’s blood,’ (cause harm to another). The Rashbam explains that a rochel is a peddler, so the commandment is to not go around and be a peddler of false information. This is engaging in lashon hara. In Pirkei Avot it is written "הוי דן כל אדם לכף זכות" (judge others favorably) while in the Gemara says another interpretation of pursuing justice is to give somebody the benefit of the doubt. According to the Gemara, however, though one is not allowed to accept lashon hara one is allowed to be suspicious of it. It gives the example in which rumors spread that a group of people from the Galilee had murdered someone. They went to Rabbi Tarfon and asked him to hide them. He explained that if he didn’t hide them, they’d be found, but if he hid them he could be guilty of accessory to murder. So he told them to go find their own place to hide. Had he turned them in he would have been accepting lashon hara, which is forbidden. By telling the group to hide and not just sending them away he was showing that he had not internalized the rumors. Sheiltot quotes this case to show that one may be suspicious and take action to protect oneself.
Rabenu Yona makes a case that when faces a morally difficult situation it is better to choose passivity rather than to do something wrong because we don’t know if the other’s blood is redder than ours. However, we learn from the Magen Avraham that if we do have information that could save a friend either physically or financially, we are obliged to tell them and not to do so out of fear that it may be lashon hara is tantamount to ‘lo taamod dam.’ Therefore, we can see a flow between the two verses from doing justice through not peddling rumors to not causing our neighbor harm. In conclusion, what one does with the information one has is tied to the intent. If one is trying to do harm, it is rechilut; if it is to protect oneself or one’s neighbor, such as a doctor informing the authorities of a hidden condition of a patient applying for a driver’s license as Rav Ovadiah discussed, it is not rechilut, and we are obliged to share that information.